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This review is about the convenience, the benefits, as well as the destructive capacities of money. It
deals with various aspects of money creation, with its value, and its appropriation. All sorts of money
tend to get corrupted by eventually creating too much of them. In the long run, this renders money
worthless and deprives people holding it. This misuse of money creation is inevitable and should
come as no surprise. Abusive money creation comes in various forms. In the present fiat money
system “suspended in free thought” and sustained merely by our belief in and our conditioning to it,
money is conveniently created out of “thin air” by excessive government spending and speculative
credit creation. Alas, any too tight money supply could ruin an economy by inviting all sorts
of unfriendly takeovers, including wars or competition. Therefore the ambivalence of money as
benefactor and destroyer should be accepted as destiny.
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A. Preface
No one is more a slave than the man who
thinks himself free while he is not. (Johann
Wolfgang von Goethe, in Elective Affinities.)
A couple of years ago, as we were having lunch at the
cafeteria, a colleague from the physics department passed
me a seemingly simple question, “how exactly is money
created?” After some ad hoc attempts of “explaining”
this to him and to myself, I ended up staring at my half-
eaten salad in bewilderment.
I almost gasped. I could not tell. I was at a miserable
loss when it came to money creation. I felt humiliated
and perplexed.
Now I am convinced that I can answer that question.
Yet I had to absorb some uncomforting facts.
Indeed, at some point I felt like the main character in
Carpenter’s 1988 movie They Live, who, after about 30
minutes into that movie, puts on some supposedly normal
pair of sunglasses, only to discover that “reality” and
the “surrounding environment,” at least as seen through
these glasses, appears to be totally different from what
he has been conditioned to believe: wherever he looks,
he reads imprinted manipulative messages, and an alien
race is intermingling with the locals.
Of the many aspects of money what is most fascinating
is its ambivalence: it can be the mediator of prosperity
and welfare of individuals and nations, and at the same
time it can be the cause of collapse of the economy. We
cannot live without money – it is a prerequisite of our
prosperity. But at the same time it cannot be rendered
without hurting us, and presenting an existential danger
to our well-being. In what follows I shall try to argue
why.
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B. Executive summary
People who are experiencing inflation yearn
for stable money and . . . those who are ac-
cepting the discipline and the costs of sta-
bility come to accept the risks of inflation.
It is this cycle that teaches us that nothing,
not even inflation is permanent. (John Ken-
neth Galbraith, in Money. Whence It Came,
Where It Went.)
The common citizen has been deceived into believing
that money is a relatively benign, passive and unsuspi-
cious medium of exchange [1–3]. However, quite on the
contrary, monetary schemes – whether they are based on
fiat money with no intrinsic commodity value or on com-
modities such as silver, copper or gold – present a sys-
tematic method to extract and reappropriate the wealth
of nations towards institutions and goals which would
not have found public support by the common man, the
middle class, and by capitalists alike.
The gist of my argument, in a nutshell, is a pretty
unspectacular claim: Money, and in particular, “much
money,” can be a benefactor as well as a malefactor.
Like the Lernaean Hydra of Greek mythology, or the God
Janus of Roman mythology, money has at least two as-
pects. If you think you can exploit one aspect, other
features show up that hurt you. If you curb the money
supply, you cripple your economy into extinction. Con-
versely, if you flood an economy with “cheap” money, the
greed for more and more money will devour that economy
from the inside out.
On the negative side, all sorts of money tend to get
overabundant, corrupted and thus depreciated. In the
long run this excess renders money worthless and even-
tually deprive people holding it. By issuing new money
and assuring new generations that this time will be dif-
ferent, the cycle of emergence and corruption starts over
again. Under very general assumptions this abuse of the
2power to create money is inevitable, stringent, and thus
should come as no surprise.
The main reason for the debasement is money multipli-
cation in various forms. Examples are the degradation of
coins by shrinking their physical size, or by salting them
with less precious metals. In the case of paper notes or
bank accounts representing precious metals, the author-
ities issue more and more notes covering less and less
commodities (e.g. silver, copper and gold) per note or
bit.
In the present fiat money system that is based on noth-
ing but our belief in it the amount of sound money is
bound only by our imagination of its (lack of) value. Es-
sentially the money we are dealing with today is based on
our fantasies about it alone. Fantasies are subjective or
epistemic and not objective or ontic. As a consequence
they may change easily and swiftly; thus making (the
perception of) money volatile to the follies of the mind.
What is even more disturbing is the conjecture that
there does not seem to exist any alternative to money
degradation. Any scheme suggesting to be able to curb
money degradation is either unsustainable or doomed for
various reasons, all insurmountable. That is it. Mone-
tary crises are an unavoidable economic destiny. As a
result, we must accept monetary crises and the economic
tides that accompany monetary cycles. Maybe the only
dignity we have is to acknowledge this fact; just as we
have to acknowledge our own death.
Who might be the major beneficiaries of the ever in-
creasing amounts of money? The usual suspects are
• governments and public institutions in general.
These organizations wish to receive money without
annoying their electorate either by direct taxation
or by cuts in public spending. Spending cuts and
increase of taxation are always inconvenient if not
outright detrimental to the powers that be, because
they represent unpopular, painful actions which are
difficult and rather tedious to implement. The ex-
tra money created in exchange of government debt
(i.e., treasury bonds) contributes to a general de-
cline in value, that is, to inflation, and thus to an
indirect taxation;
• the “Money Trust” – consisting of all money issuing
entities, in particular today’s central banks as well
as the banking and financial industry in general,
acquiring “something for nothing” [4]; by collecting
⋆ valuable assets through monetization (see
later);
⋆ interest through the issue of fiat money in ex-
change of debt certificates (mostly government
bonds);
• people holding money or assets if (and only if) they
are able to realize cumulative advantages [some-
times also referred to compound interest or the
Matthews Effect [5]]; , as well as
• insiders or lucky speculants.
On the positive side, an abundance of money – an econ-
omy awash in money and liquidity – creates a “comfort
zone” which seemingly pleases everybody. In particular,
the public at large profits from an expanding economy
in many obvious ways; at least until inflation or the in-
evitable economic crises sets in, after which a new busi-
ness cycle starts.
The situation is complicated by the fact that money-
wise the economy is no zero-sum game – sometimes all
participants gain without losing; in these fair periods of
high liquidity, the economy is in “win-win mode,” deliv-
ering wealth to everybody. Thus it is not always true
that all sorts of money are competing for only a lim-
ited amount of goods [6, 7], that [8, Chapter II] “other
things equal, prices vary directly with the quantities of
money in circulation,” and thus more money just means
less goods per money unit; hence inflation. For ideally
more money creates more economic activity, which re-
sults in more goods, the existence of which can motivate
(via monetization, see later) even more money, spiraling
[9, 10] on and on. Unfortunately, driven by (too) much
money, an economy can spiral up- as well as downwards.
The Author does not consider governments or organi-
zations in general as “evil” per se, nor does he negate
their necessity [11, p. 715]. Nonetheless, he calls on the
Reader to be critical about, and deeply distrust the pow-
ers that be. Whenever they deem it in their interests
governments and all forms of institutions react decisively,
radically and brutally to extract wealth from anybody,
including their own citizens.
From today’s perspective it appears hardly believable
that in the last century totalitarian dictatorships such
as Soviet Bolshevism, but also democracies such as Roo-
sevelt’s United States of America (from 1933 to 1975)
ripped off gold from, and subsequently prohibited the
possession of gold by their citizens. During the regency
following Louis XIV. in France, possession of more than
a small amount (five hundred livres) of coins was forbid-
den [12, p. 30]. Just recently, the Hungarian government
announced plans to confiscate savings out of private pen-
sion funds to “stabilize” the roaring public deficit. This
goes on and on. In history, sovereigns and states have
stolen the wealth of their subordinates and citizens a zil-
lion of times, and they will do so again and again if they
consider it necessary. Often monetary policy and instru-
ments effectively amount to more or less obvious ways to
plunder the public.
C. Remarks on methodology
CAPTAIN SHOTOVER. . . . Give me deeper
darkness. Money is not made in the light.
. . .
MAZZINI. . . . It’s amazing how well we get
along, all things considered. (George Bernard
3Shaw, in Heartbreak House, Act I, § ii and
Act III, § ii.)
Money appears to be one of the most amazing and
mind-boggling entities: we are conditioned to its perva-
sion, yet we may have merely enigmatic, uncertain ideas
of how it is created, how it evolves, and even how it
is being accounted. The epistemology of money is con-
fusing and comprises many intertwining layers of narra-
tives; some so trivial they resemble well-told fairy tales
of deception [1–3], some so “deep” they appear to be
rooted in metaphysics [13]. Can we evade [14] the maze
or veil created by our conditioning, and erected through
(dis)information from the media, contradictory economic
theories, ideologies, and influential groups who have a
vested interest in one way or another?
Indeed, Galbraith [8, Chapters I and III] notes that
Those who talk of money and teach us about
it and make their living by it gain prestige,
esteem and pecuniary return, as does a doc-
tor or a witch doctor, from cultivating the
belief that they are in privileged association
with the occult. . . . Though professionally
rewarding and personally profitable, this too
is a well-established form of fraud. . . . The
study of money, above all other fields in eco-
nomics, is one in which complexity is used to
disguise truth or to evade truth, not to reveal
it.
. . .
The process by which banks create money is
so simple the mind is repelled. With some-
thing so important, a deeper mystery seems
only decent.
Whatever might be the intentions of both the Read-
ers, the Author, and of some protagonists, I would like
to suggest to uphold an advice by Sigmund Freud to his
successors [15], to be aware of the dangers caused by
“temptations to project, what [[the analyst]] in dull self-
perception recognizes as the peculiarities of his own per-
sonality, as generally valid theory into science.” In this
spirit, economies are treated as a client-patients, and
whatever findings come up are accepted as is, without
any immediate emphasis or judgment. It is therefore at-
tempted not to impose any kind of ideological agenda, be-
sides, probably, the opportunistic guiding principle sub-
sumed by the Latin phrase “cui bono?” meaning “to
whose benefit?”
Every effort has been made to express the following
thoughts briefly, clearly and comprehensively. Being a
theoretical physicist himself, the Author is particularly
frustrated by any vain attempt to heavily formalize and
mathematize macroeconomic processes and issues. Be-
sides academic gratifications, such endeavors often lead
to nowhere.
From a pragmatic point of view the current macroe-
conomic theories have very little if any predictive power.
Indeed, maybe even a random number generator emanat-
ing advises based on pure chance would perform better!
Of course, I would not discourage formalization as such
– just on the contrary – but the reductionist program
fails for complicated, complex and open systems which
cannot be standardized and reduced to simple behaviors
which can be composed into, or scaled to, macroeconomic
scales.
Thus, very little mathematics is presented; instead I
suggest to use analytical, critical reasoning and empirical
evidence as far as possible. After all, life is too short to
spoil it with an unnecessary amount of useless formalism.
I would also like to mention a caveat: some Readers
might want to wave off the following thoughts as sound-
ing suspiciously like a weirdo telling you revisionist con-
spiracy theories. Actually, the Author ensures his Read-
ers that he himself has tried hard to convince himself
that “all is well” with our monetary system, besides some
crackpots claiming to uphold the “true truth” while dis-
seminating crappy thoughts about this or that. As mat-
ters stand, I would consider such a position to be irre-
sponsible.
Alas, Readers who do not want to be troubled might
want to stop reading and enjoy themselves in oblivion as
long as they can (afford). If somebody wants to believe
in some “Sparefroh” mentality, I have no intention to
trouble such a person. For those not willing to, or being
incapable of, providing the intelligence and willingness to
cope with certain situations, a lot of mostly unpleasant
and unexpected surprises might happen throughout their
lifes. But then, they might just as well be lucky.
The apologetic title has been chosen because, despite
all shortcomings, the Author can think of no reasonable
alternative to money, in particular, to fiat money. Thus
in a very general sense he is afraid that, despite its ap-
parent inherent and irreducible lack of stability and the
resulting inevitable crises, there is no feasible alternative
to money. And so the show goes on and on; generation
after generation, and business cycle after business cycle.
I. MONEY CREATION BALANCED BY SOME
THING
A. Commodity versus fiat money
I am time, the mighty destroyer of the world,
out to destroy. Even without your participa-
tion all the warriors standing arrayed in the
opposing armies shall cease to exist. There-
fore stand up, obtain glory! Conquer your
enemies, acquire fame and enjoy a prosper-
ous kingdom. All these warriors have already
been destroyed by me. You are only an in-
strument. (Krishna insisting upon Arjuna to
fight, in Bhagavad Gita, Chapter XI:32,33.)
When it comes to “paying” some thing with another
4thing[16] there are at least three possibilities: either giv-
ing this other thing in exchange for some thing acquired,
or giving a representation of this other thing for some
thing acquired, or giving something believed to be gener-
ically valuable. Indeed, this is reflected by the possible
types of money, as there appear to be at least three major
options:
• commodity (such as gold, copper or silver) based
money,
• one-to-one representations in lieu of commodities,
and
• fiat money which has no intrinsic commodity value
besides the beliefs people hold about it.
In the latter cases, the physical “layer” or substrate
is arbitrary and not important as long as it appreciated
by everybody. Today fiat money is mostly represented
by decimal digits in bank accounts, which in turn are
represented by (electric) states in semiconductors. These
states can be “translated” into paper money (notes) or
into coins on demand at teller machines; but mostly they
are directly transformed into assets, goods, or services.
At first glance commodity based monetary schemes
should be less vulnerable to inflation and degradation
because ideally the amount of money should be strictly
limited by the aggregate amount of that commodity. Un-
fortunately, as history and some critical analysis shows,
in the log run commodity money appears almost as easily
corruptible as intrinsically worthless fiat type money:
• The commodity can be substituted by or salted with
less precious substances. In the case of gold this
might be tungsten, whose density (near room tem-
perature) of 19.25 g/cm3 is almost the same as that
of gold, which is 19.30 g/cm3, but whose price is a
fraction thereof.
• The above issues are connected to the impossibil-
ity to certify the commodity against counterfeits
in typical market situations. How can you be sure
that the grains of gold, copper or silver I present
to you for your precious something really are gold,
copper or silver? You cannot and never will be,
for the capacity to certify is accompanied by the
capacity to counterfeit.
• If, for convenience and sustainability and certifica-
tion, gold or any commodity is substituted by any
kind of representation thereof – such as notes refer-
ring to and redeemable to gold, even in a one-to-one
manner by carrying the number of an associated
gold bar – then this substitute, which is intrinsi-
cally worthless, is exposed to all the follies of fiat
money; in particular its multiplication by the au-
thorities.
Despite these issues related to unfounded money mul-
tiplication, there are other disadvantages of commodity
based money:
• A commodity based monetary system is tied much
stronger to the almost uncontrollable availability
and abundance of that commodity [e.g., the eco-
nomically negligible production of gold from mer-
cury through transmutation [17]] and the resulting
undesirable dependence of the amount of money on
the aggregate amount of the commodity [18].
• In a commodity based monetary system it is im-
possible to increase the money supply by the mere
expectation of future profits. As desirable this fact
may be, it results in the impossibility to expand,
defend and sustain the economic and (geo)political
status quo. The resulting lack of liquidity cripples
commodity money based economies with respect
to others, in particular with respect to economic
expansion and military defense. From a financial
point of view, the amount of military expansion
is dominated by the arbitrary but strict limits on
the commodities (mostly silver, copper and gold).
Thus eventually any such commodity money based
economy will fall prey to an economy based on fiat
money.
For instance, take the expansionist monetary and mil-
itary policy of Nazi Germany before and during World
War II. As stated by Smith Jr. [19, p. xi], “from 1938 un-
til 1945, . . . Hitler looted the central banks of occupied
Europe.” After the Anschluss, the German Reichsbank
sacked & absorbed the Austrian central bank gold re-
serves, which amounted to more than 91 tons of gold [19,
p. 2]. Although a catastrophe in other humanitarian and
political aspects, from a purely economic point of view,
the German annexation of Austria by force was a big
success from the German point of view, and a big fail
from the Austrian perspective. All previous Austrian
austerity measures directed at sustaining a noninflation-
ary currency only contributed to its inability to defend
against an “unfriendly takeover,” and ultimately to the
profit of its aggressor.
Thus, for pragmatic reasons, the only remaining alter-
native appears to be fiat money not directly backed by
any commodity. Fiat money should be intrinsically al-
most worthless, making it possible to almost indefinitely
expand its quantity. The liquidity supplied to an econ-
omy by such a money volume expansion may result in a
positive feedback loop of ever increasing production and
prosperity. However, by the same negative feedback, it
may also result in (hyper-)inflation by the restless pro-
duction of additional money. For instance, it is a math-
ematical fact that the compound interest requires exces-
sive (actually exponential) money quantities. In the long
run, no such excessive growth of liquidity can be coun-
terbalanced by the traded assets, goods and services.
One may argue that the supply (or increase) of fiat
money should somehow be linked to the gross domestic
product, but this can be abandoned from the outright
for many reasons: there is no direct control of fiat money
once the system is set “into motion.” Indeed, the fiat
5money created by the financial sector, or by the aggre-
gate of property, by far outnumbers any kind of economic
indicator even weakly linked to the gross domestic prod-
uct. So, fiat money is only backed by the belief in and
by the fantasies people have about it alone.
In what follows, if not stated otherwise, money will be
interpreted as fiat money in its various forms – coins and
notes, states in a bank account, future promises et cetera.
Fiat money is the most convenient, flexible, dynamic and
potentially explosive type of money known today. As we
shall see, an economy based on fiat money is suspended
in believe. As beliefs change, so changes the perception
and the value of fiat money.
B. Types of fiat money
It is absurd to say that our country can issue
$30 million in bonds and not $30 million in
currency. Both are promises to pay, but one
fattens the usurers and the other helps the
people. If the currency issued by the Gov-
ernment was no good, then the bonds would
be no good either. It is a terrible situation
when the Government, to increase the na-
tional wealth, must go into debt and submit
to ruinous interest charges . . .. (Thomas Alva
Edison, quoted in The New York Times, De-
cember 6, 1921)
Fiat money comes in very different forms. In what fol-
lows two principal forms of fiat money will be discussed:
fiat money created by the Money Trust, and fiat money
created directly by governments or other institutions, if
they are authorized to do so.
1. Historic money based on reserve banking
Exactly when the idea appeared to issue a representa-
tion of some precious commodity – also called “money”
– backed by some reserve of that precious commodity in
the possession of the issuer of that representation, is un-
clear. It remains also unknown exactly when the idea
emerged to issue more representations of precious com-
modities than is “backed by” the underlying “reserve” of
that precious commodity.
The latter idea may appear both as a fraud on the
receiver of this representation money, or a genial move
toward more liquidity and the resulting increase in eco-
nomic activity, and thus in the generation of wealth for
everybody. Indeed, this ambivalence towards reserve
money is the basis of many fundamental debates in eco-
nomics.
Galbraith [8, Chapter III] presents the following ficti-
tious history of the invention of reserve banking:
The deposits of the Bank of Amsterdam . . .
were, according to the instruction of the
owner, subject to transfer to others in set-
tlement of accounts. (This had long been a
convenience provided by the Bank’s private
precursors.) The coin on deposit served no
less as money by being in a bank and being
subject to transfer by the stroke of a primitive
pen.
Here Galbraith points out the convenience of “pen”
money bank accounts: instead of a direct transfer of (sup-
posedly precious) coins from the buyer to the seller, or
instead of physically redistributing the coins at the bank
by transferring them into a different vault (supposedly by
withdrawing the coins from the buyer’s vault and deposit-
ing them into the seller’s vault), the bank just reshuffles
the corresponding quantities “on paper.” It does so by
“tagging” the coins previously owned by the buyer with
another owner, the seller, through inscribing “into their
books” this amount dedicated to the use of the latter.
Galbraith continues,
Inevitably it was discovered . . . that another
stroke of the pen would give a borrower from
the bank, as distinct from a creditor of the
original depositor, a loan from the original
and idle deposit. It was not a detail that the
bank would have the interest on the loan so
made. The original depositor could be told
that his deposit was subject to such use – and
perhaps be paid for it. The original deposit
still stood to the credit of the original depos-
itor. But there was now also a new deposit
from the proceeds of the loan. Both deposits
could be used to make payments, be used as
money. Money had thus been created. . . .
There was that interest to be earned. Where
such reward is waiting, men have a natural
instinct for innovation.
That is, now the bank – in lieu of the original owner –
gives away ownership of the deposit to some third party,
the borrower. The motivation for this transaction is
the interest paid by the borrower. This interest might
somwhow be split among the original owner (for the pro-
vision of the original deposit) and the bank (for their
services in marketing and handling the loan).
Galbraith then continues,
There was an alternative opportunity involv-
ing bank notes . . . That was to give the bor-
rower not a deposit but a note redeemable in
the hard currency that had been placed in the
bank as capital or as a sedentary deposit.
Here, finally, the bank gets rid of the original owner of
the deposit and issues its loan money without referring
to the former, as long as a certain fraction of deposits is
reserved for redemption of the money notes issued.[20]
Evidently the advantage of the latter scheme is that the
bank does not have to share the profits from the interest
6payments. And so, fractional banking might have been
born.
The profit of a bank is proportional to the amount
of money it can generate and issue. Thus, because the
more money can be created with the available reserves
the more credit can be given, and the more interest con-
tributing to bank profits can be collected.
2. Fiat money based on fractional reserve banking as we
know it
The historic type of reserve banking mentioned above
has been developed into a supposedly more sophisticated
fractional reserve banking [21]. Thereby, fiat money as
we know it today is basically generated by banks in a
kind of cascade mechanism.
To governments and central bankers the fractional
reserve banking, as compared to reserve banking in-
volving only private banks, has the advantage that, at
least in principle, the source of all money is a central
bank. In some ways central banks may thus be easier to
hold accountable, control, and steer into particular modi
operandi – such as printing money or buying treasury
bonds – than private banks. Whether this possibility to
manipulate the money supply is a desirable feature de-
pends on the perspective, and on subjective interests.
Boot money generated by central banks
Thereby, to boot a currency, the primary fiat money is
“produced” by cental banks out of thin air.
Reserves, for instance in the form of gold or foreign cur-
rencies, are not necessarily required for this boot process.
Nevertheless, the impression of their existence generates
public trust domestically and abroad (thereby fostering
trade). Thus historically central banks were often sup-
posed to possess “appropriate” amounts of reserves such
as gold or other deposits of value.
Examples of central banks are
• the Bank of England. It started as a private corpo-
ration that became nationalized by a Labour gov-
ernment in 1946;
• the Federal Reserve System in the United States of
America It is “much like” a private corporation.[22]
Its actual ownership structure remains unclear [23];
• the Bank of Japan. It is a stock company whose
subscribers are mainly the government (holding
55% of the total subscription), as well as individ-
uals (holding 45% of the total subscription). It is
also owned by financial institutions, public organi-
zations, securities companies, and other firms; [24]
• the Schweizerische Nationalbank (Swiss National
Bank). It is a stock company currently co-owned
by 2225 private and 78 public shareholders;[25]
• the Eurosystem and its member banks, such as
the O¨sterreichische Nationalbank (National Bank
of Austria), which became nationalized lately.[26]
Secondary money generated by commercial banks
This primary fiat money is then multiplied by private
banks which – at least ideally and in principle – must
hold a certain percentage of the money they themselves
produce (again out of thin air against some collaterals).
The minimal reserve requirements (or cash reserve ratio)
vary greatly from zero percent (0%) fractional reserves
in countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada
or Mexico, to 30% in Lebanon. In the United States it is
zero percent (0%) fractional reserves up to 10%, depend-
ing on the size of deposits a bank holds, in Switzerland
it is 2.5%, in Japan it is up to 1.2%, and in the Eurozone
it is 2%.
In theory, the multiplication process could go on in-
definitely in a geometric progression with smaller and
smaller amounts of money, yielding a finite money mul-
tiplier which is the sum of all the money generated [21].
But this is hardly realistic, given the constant tendency
of financial institutions to evade the minimal reserve re-
quirements by “outsourcing” the generated debt through
collateralized debt obligations or other accounting strate-
gies.
Commercial banks do not make much profits from
“Sparefroh” activities such as collecting savings from
their customers. Actually, customer savings accounts
might be even perceived painful, as in this case the cash
flow is negative towards that customers. The main profits
are generated by interest payments from credit creation.
3. Government created fiat money as we do not know it
Throughout history, governments have always printed
(fiat) money directly, without the intermediary of a cen-
tral bank issuing fiat money in return for government
(treasury) bonds as collateral.
The big difference in this regime with respect to fiat
money created in a fractional reserve banking scheme as
quoted earlier is the fact that the issuing government
does not have to pay any interest on the money it cre-
ated itself. Stated pointedly, money creation is not tied
to the creation of public debt, and as a result does not
imply payment of interest (by the collection of taxes) to
anybody, and in particular not to central banks. More
polemically direct money creation by governments ex-
cludes usury.
Often excessive money creation by governments, after
a subsequent inflation, have rendered this money worth-
less. The American Revolutionary War [8], the French
Revolution [27], and the Soviet Revolution in Russia are
examples of political turnovers which financed the asso-
ciated military and social measures with excessively cre-
7ated money which subsequently became worthless; see
also the quotation from Benjamin Franklin in Chapter
IIIG. Also non-revolutionary France after the reign of
Louis XIV. [12, p. 6] printed eccessive amounts of money.
Examples for such a more stable fiat money directly
created by a government (without some bank intermedi-
ary) is the greenback referring to greenish paper currency
that was originally issued directly into circulation by the
United States Treasury to pay expenses incurred by the
Union during the American Civil War and President Lin-
coln. It was not backed by any gold standard but instead
was backed by the authority of the United States gov-
ernment, and indirectly by the people living and paying
taxes there.
4. Which tail wags which dog?
Indeed, one argument in favor of the central banking
way of creating money and against direct government
money printing, is the capacity of the central bank to act,
at least in principle, as just an additional power whose
independence should be assured by the principle of the
separation of powers model for the governance of states,
along the normal division of government branches into
an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary. Although
breaches of this separation principle are to be expected,
they might be rare in not-so-corrupt phases of history.
However, it is not totally unreasonable that, although
this principle could be upheld for some time, it will even-
tually be corrupted by so-called “just causes.” These
comprise
• preparation for war,
• financing unbalanced budgets by dept as an alter-
native to unpopular budget cuts or tax increases,
or
• the fight against economic crises after speculative
bubbles collapse.
All of the above contribute to money multiplication and
thus to a demise of that money.
The Author takes it to be evident that no central bank,
private or public, can withstand the pressure of politics
in the long run. In particular, in times of crises, if central
banks are pressured by politics and their “peers,” they
may (in)directly issue “the required amount of money”
(as seen by the government) in exchange of government
or private debt (sometimes referred to as quantitative eas-
ing).
It appears almost ridiculous to pretend that (central)
banks can effectively act independently from politics.
They do not and can never be expected to do so. For
the sake of a historic evidence consider the fate of the
Knights Templar.
Indeed, throughout regular times, the interplay be-
tween central banks and policy is not so visible, but in
particular in times of crises it is not difficult to realize
that central banks are at governments’ and thus politi-
cians’ mercy – at least in state owned central banks it is
an understatement that the “political tail” is the master
to begin with. In systems like the Eurosystem, politics
goes some ways to ensure that, for instance, at least of-
ficially the heads of the central banks are not directly
linked to political parties; but anybody with even a slight
interest in these issues could be well aware of the negoti-
ations going on between major political and national fac-
tions when it comes to persons and strategies. In Austria,
this system is called Sta¨ndestaat and Proporz (from ap-
propriation of power, privileges and resources by different
political and social factions), as opposed to the United
States of America plutocratic [28] system of lobbyism ,
and the Soviet system of privileged nomenclatura.
For example, the current governor of the National
Bank of Austria has served as a member of parliament
for the Social Democrats from 1978 until 1999. Previ-
ous governors have been close to or associated with the
Austrian People’s Party. As stated earlier, the National
Bank of Austria has recently been fully nationalized; its
previous owners had also been interest groups such as
trade unions, the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber,
the Federation of Austrian Industries as well as some pri-
vate banks and insurance companies.
Nevertheless it is not totally clear whether, quite on
the contrary to state influence on the Money Trust, one
might more appropriately consider some central banks as
the “tail wagging the state.” This may be particularly
correct if central banks are privately owned, such as the
Federal Reserve System whose past and present owner-
ship remains unclear [23].[29] There are some indications
that governments are forced to accept settlements of or
securities for debt, as well as pay (compound) interest
on (treasury) bonds which are favourable for the Money
Trust. Nevertheless, the Author strongly doubts that –
just because government defines the modus operandi of
states – any kind of ownership structure can withstand
government influence in the long run. As noted by [8,
Chapter IV], “governments keep their central banks on
the shortest of leashes. This is true, with all others, of
the Federal Reserve System in the United States, which
enjoys the liturgy but not the reality of independence.”
Whatever benign motives may there be for private cen-
tral banking, and whatever stronghold the government
may exert on its central bank – even if (in)direct manip-
ulation can be excluded (indeed, how could it ever be?)
– the ownership of a central bank at least entitles to first-
hand (inside) information about the monetary measures
taken (such as raising the interest rates). So, the frac-
tional reserve banking scheme, centered around a central
bank, might be rather profitable for those engaged in it.
C. Monetization as nothing for some thing
This is the origin of modern money as noth-
ing for something on the part of the legitimate
8user; as something for nothing on the part of
the issuer; and as something for a promise to
pay it back on the part of the borrower, with
sufficient security to whom the issuer trans-
ferred the acquisition of the something accru-
ing gratis from the issue. [Frederick Soddy, in
The Role of Money. What it should be, con-
trasted with what it has become [4].]
Suppose somebody organizes a society of co-operating
individuals and institutions. Obviously, any such config-
uration should not consist of self-sufficient monads, but
the parties should have scarce entities such as assets, ser-
vices and products to offer to one another; that is, these
assets present some form of value in the mind of other
agents or participants. The recognition, negotiation and
exchange of these assets take place in some agora or mar-
ket.
Besides other functions of money as a measure of eco-
nomic values and thus of price, a unit of account, a store
of value, as well as a measure of dept, money is often in-
troduced as a medium of exchange and transaction. The
amount of value of an asset expressed in units of money
is called price.
There emerge two immediate questions:
• what is the value of assets, and how are the prices
fixed; and
• how exactly did the negotiating parties obtain their
money?
Let us consider the second question first – that is, how
do the negotiating parties obtain their money? Quite
simply, one can obtain money, say, for a bull. That, of
course, is only relegating the issue to the customer who
offers this money: from where did this customer obtain
the money? Probably by selling some hay bushels to
somebody else in exchange of money, and so on and so
on. This indirect barter could go on forever without any
clue about how the money was introduced into the system
in the first place, provided the economy contains enough
money to allow unimpeded exchange.
Ideally, in a purely commodity based monetary sys-
tem, barter could be maintained forever. For in such
a system some commodities, say gold, copper or silver,
take on effectively the role of money. Everyone in the
possession of this commodity can acquire anything else,
as this commodity is accepted as barter by anybody else.
Commodity money needs no monetization, as the market
value of the commodity could, at least in ideal markets,
be related to the market value of the asset exchanged,
thus fixing the price in terms of the commodity (money).
This is not the case for fiat money, because this type
of medium of exchange, or (legal) tender, has almost no
intrinsic commodity value whatsoever. So how exactly
does fiat money enter the system in the first place? The
answer is through monetization, that is, the process of
converting some asset into some form of money that is
generally believed and accepted as a settlement of an ex-
change or a debt. Obviously, in order to be generally
accepted, the issuing agency has to be a publicly certi-
fied and accepted authority.
Fiat money presents no intrinsic commodity value, and
thus cannot be directly related by its (nonexistent) com-
modity value. As a substitute of intrinsic commodity
value, some (central or noncentral) bank authority is-
suing the fiat money guarantees and certifies its value.
Pointedly stated, in an almost magical manner, some
agency (im)prints something on a sheet of paper or dig-
ital account, and in that manner creates money out of
“thin air.” Henceforth, any such agency will be called
bank. Examples of banks are central banks issuing cen-
tral bank money (e.g., coins and bills), private (invest-
ment) noncentral banks, or funds, creating computerized
deposit money accounts containing digits, or I-Owe-You’s
on some substratum, mostly on paper.
As stated earlier, trust, faith & authority is essential;
else everybody would print their own money. For various
reasons also mentioned earlier, in real-time market situ-
ations there is no reasonable way of getting rid of trust,
faith & authority. Even gold is subject to counterfeiting;
for instance by salting it with tungsten, or even covering
tungsten bars with a thin layer of gold.
For the sake of demonstration, suppose you are a
cashier. Then you surely would not take a sheet of blank
paper where I just wrote “e 100” as down payment for a
bottle of wine, returning to me some central bank notes
as change; yet you would be willing to value that same
sheet of paper if it is “backed” by some authority – such
as a credit card company – you have been conditioned to
trust.
Monetization facilitates the chain of exchanges, as
banks pass on the money created to somebody possessing
assets, thereby acquiring (rights on) these assets. In the
view of the asset holder, monetization is the act of turn-
ing in (rights on) assets, thereby obtaining money. From
the bank’s perspective, the exchange looks conversely. In
this process, the bank acquires both the asset as well as
liabilities (balanced by the ownership of the asset) in the
form of the money issued. Note that, the bank just pro-
duces money effortlessly “out of thin air,” whereas the
asset holder had to acquire (e.g. inherit or produce) the
asset before selling it to the bank. Surely this puts the
banks in a very privileged position: it effortlessly acquires
assets and their associated utilities by producing intrinsi-
cally worthless money. Another privilege of banks which
will be discussed below is the levy of interest on debt.
After monetization, the bank can utilize the asset,
whereas the seller and previous owner of that asset can
utilize the money issued by the bank. In one extreme
case, the money may remain “dormant” in the bank’s ac-
count, possibly without even collecting (much) interest;
this would be most favorable for the bank. In the other
extreme, the seller rushes to convert the bank’s money
immediately into nonbank assets, commodities (such as
silver, copper, gold, or oil), or central bank money; any
9such exchange would be least favorable for the bank.
Why should anyone trade in fiat money issued by
banks, which is intrinsically worthless, for an asset which
has some utility? Because under normal conditions any-
one could exchange fiat money for other valuable assets
and utilities.
Examples of monetization are the bank’s acquisition of
• government bonds (based on future government in-
come; e.g., claims of taxes),
• future claims on profits of or assets in non-
governmental institutions, such as corporations,
• real estate property,
• commodities,
• shares in a business or company,
• foreign money,
• finance derivatives, including over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives,
• “Love Letters” [30–32], that is, mutual liabilities
exchanged by banks [e.g., three subsidiaries of Ice-
landic banks were posting such notes as collateral
at the Central Bank of Luxembourg, receiving Eu-
rosystem loans in exchange, on which they subse-
quently defaulted [33]].
Pro forma, the insertion of money into an economy
via monetization is just another exchange, taking place
between the bank and the holder of the asset without
any “intermediate” money state; the role of the bank’s
asset being played by money. As a rule of thumb, banks
will monetize everything they seem fit according to some
rules laid out by laws and regulatory bodies, and bound
by ratings issued by rating agencies.
D. Value and price of things not traded
Using our housing market data from the first
11 months of the year, along with some fore-
casting for December, our research arm has
calculated that U.S. homes are set to lose
$1.7 trillion in values during 2010. . . . Since
the peak of home values in June 2006, more
than $9 trillion in values has come out of the
housing market. (Katie Curnutte, Zillow PR
Manager, in Zillow Blog “Early 2010 Hous-
ing Stabilization Fizzles; U.S. Homes Set to
Lose $1.7 Trillion This Year” on December 9,
2010)
What does an alleged loss of US$ 9, 000, 000, 000, 000 =
US$ 9 × 1012 – or, expressed in ISO standards, 9 tera-
US$, or 9 TUS$ – in property values exactly mean? For
the sake of demonstration, suppose (very unrealistically)
that none of these properties is available for sale. Then,
as these properties are not traded, not really much hap-
pens at all. Some home owners might get a bad feeling
like “oh my, our house lost part of its potential selling
value!” But as long as they do not speculate and use
their houses for living in them (and have no mortgages
on them), the value of these houses are completely irrel-
evant. This is very similar to crashes or rises of price in
other markets, say stocks or commodities. What, to take
another example, does it mean to you that your wedding
ring doubled its value since the gold price doubled?
Thus, all values of goods and services which are not
traded – and this is the vast majority thereof – are coun-
terfactuals based on “What Ifs.” A counterfactual is a
would-be-price or contrary-to-fact conditional [34] which
has not been paid but potentially could have been paid
if some market participants would have decided to do so;
alas the market participants decided to act differently,
either by not buying or selling anything or by buying or
selling a different thing.
Already scholastic philosophy, for instance, Thomas
Aquinas, considered similar questions such as whether
God has knowledge of non-existing things [35, part one,
question 14, article 9] or things that are not yet [35, part
one, question 14, article 13]; see also Specker’s [1960,
p. 243] reference to infuturabilities in the context of quan-
tum theory.
E. Value and price of traded things
Another story is told of an English traveler,
which is scarcely less ludicrous. This gen-
tleman, an amateur botanist, happened to
see a tulip-root lying in the conservatory of
a wealthy Dutchman. Being ignorant of its
quality, he took out his penknife, and peeled
off its coats, with the view of making experi-
ments upon it. When it was by this means re-
duced to half its size, he cut it into two equal
sections, making all the time many learned
remarks on the singular appearances of the
unknown bulb. Suddenly, the owner pounced
upon him, and, with fury in his eyes, asked
him if he knew what he had been doing?
“Peeling a most extraordinary onion,” replied
the philosopher. “Hundert tausend duyvel!”
said the Duchman; “it’s an “Admiral Van der
Eyck.” . . . and, notwithstanding all [[the En-
glish traveller]] could urge in extenuation, he
was lodged in prison until he found securi-
ties for the payment of this sum. (Charles
Mackay, in Memoirs of Extraordinary Pop-
ular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds.
Volume I)
For those things traded the value or price can be ex-
pressed and represented by the amount of money neces-
sary to acquire them on some market. It is determined
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and fixed in a market or agora, ideally via supply and
demand. That is, the amount of money necessary to buy
some thing – its price – is the quantitative measure of
value.
In more practical terms, value and prices are derived
from fantasies people have about scarce assets. Thereby
it is less important what really is than what people believe
what really is. In particular in times of hype and crises,
the public perception of the scarcity or abundance of an
entity is of greater relevance than the fundamentals. In
this sense, prices are epistemic rather than ontologic.
Suppose I would possess a horse, and I would develop
fantasies about romantic rides in the woods; I might get
so excited and emotional about these horse riding fan-
tasies that my break-even point for selling this horse to
somebody else (maybe with similar fantasies) settles at a
multitude of the price at which I myself bought the horse
earlier. If I sell, I make a profit. The exchange will go
through if I can communicate, establish and realize that
kind of fantasy at some market.
Recall, for example, past price rises of some inner city
property, or of some property sections close to the sea
shore or to a lake. These sections have been valued very
poorly by the original farmers possessing them; for their
utilization of land was not in terms of beauty and recre-
ation, but in terms of harvest and food.
As there are various markets with very different fan-
tasies and utilities – some of them rather isolated from
each other – many fantasies co-exist at any given time in
a single economy. The common element of the economy
is the money available or created. Since it is dependent
on various asset values and prices, which itself are de-
termined by fantasies, the amount of monetization is a
dynamic, volatile quantity. Moreover, the relative appro-
priation is dynamic: it may, for instance, be possible for
one group of assets – say, for example, stocks or other
financial assets – to “overtake” other sectors or economic
segments – say, for example, labor salaries or property
prices. Thereby, a dynamic appropriation of money is
obtained.
These mild forms of subjectivity and conventionality of
value and price are prevalent in normal times when prices
vary slowly. In times of hype and crises, the subjective
element dominates any objective considerations (such as
“utility thresholds”), and prices surge and drop dramati-
cally without immediate objective reason. This behavior
can possibly be best understood in terms of mass hyste-
ria [12] an positive and negative feedback loops [37] lead-
ing to instabilities. We shall come back to these issues
later.
It should always be kept in mind those changes in
values as well as price stability are always accompanied
by (sometimes counterfactual) reappropriation. Any in-
crease, stability or decrease in value takes place in a big-
ger market situations, in which prices are effectively only
relative measures of value.
F. Limits to fiat monetization
Could monetization go on forever? Essentially yes [38],
but monetization is, at least in principle, bound by three
constraints:
• by the asset value, as assessed by rating agencies
or otherwise;
• by the reserve assets an economy is capable to ren-
der; and
• by the types of necessary reserves, as the seller may
request to be paid in money (e.g., by central bank
money, in case of noncentral banks, or by foreign
exchange in case of central banks), or commodi-
ties a bank is incapable to produce (such as gold,
copper, silver or energy).
In particular, in fractional reserve banking
schemes [21], the money creation by noncentral
banks should, at least by this principle, be bound by
the inverse of the required fraction of central bank
reserves [3]. How much and what kind of asset qualifies
as adequate collateral and eligible asset for reserves is a
matter of convention. These conventions are listed in a
somewhat lengthy and unjustified boring enumeration of
all qualifying assets; for instance the documents issued
by the Eurosystem [39, Chapter 6,7] for the Eurosystem,
and by Federal Reserve system [40].
As experience shows that does not prevent central
banks to deliver ad hoc money also to other entities in
times of crises. Through “quantitative easing” policies
central banks in Japan, Britain, the United States of
America, and in the Eurozone have bought up treasury
bonds of (their respective) states, as well as corporate
bonds and stocks. It is one of the big mind-boggling fea-
tures of the present fiat monetary system that – most
likely due to the general trust our moneys continue to
enjoy in public – this has not (yet) led to greater infla-
tion.
Understandably, in order to get rid of external limits,
a bank will try to evade the restrictions originating from
the reserve requirements mentioned before by various
methods and techniques. The explosion of the money ag-
gregates produced by the commercial non-central banks,
often denoted by M1, M2, and M3, as compared to the
coins and notes in circulation, denoted by M0, is a very
clear indicator thereof. In doing so, at least in principle,
any individual bank could acquire the available marketed
assets by newly created money even beyond the “utility
threshold” – which is bound by the interest rates – for
private investors. Of course, acquisition may not be a
bank’s primary role or concern since after acquisition the
bank would have to properly utilize the asset; a task
which it may find notoriously incapable of performing.
Note that monetization of assets depends greatly on
fixing its “intuitive” market value in terms of a formal
price (in currency units). As assets are often not di-
rectly marketed or traded, the fixation of asset prices is
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consigned to rating agencies. If the rating agencies are
co-owned by the very banks monetizing the asset, or if
they are paid by either (buyer’s or seller’s) side of the
transaction, a conflict of interest may occur [41]. That
is, by overrating assets systematically, a bank my effec-
tively be able to generate its own almost unlimited supply
of money.
Note also that, as has already been shortly mentioned
earlier, the ratio of money created by the central bank
versus other banks can be estimated by ratios of cur-
rency components, serving as empirical measures of ag-
gregates of money stock. Bank money is often denoted
by M1, M2, M3; as compared to the amount M0 of cur-
rency, that is, coins and notes, in circulation. This ratio
amounts to a few percent (M3 is no longer published for
the U.S. Dollar), so most of the money is not in currency
stock. Through the fractional reserve banking scheme
utilizing the reverse multiplier [21], and through other
less benign and accountable practices of money creation,
– for instance, by bundling and re-selling debt as invest-
ments which have a (triple-A or lower) rating from rating
agencies indirectly belonging to the issuers – most of this
noncash money is created by noncentral banks.
G. Absence of a counterbalance between fiat
money and assets
Ideally, the money volume should be counterbalanced
by marketable assets (and future entities; see below), so
that there neither is a “lack” nor an “excess” of money,
resulting in deflation and recession, or in inflation, re-
spectively. I leave it to the Reader to imagine how hope-
less such an endeavor of the creation and maintenance
of a “balanced fiat monetary equilibrium” in economies
with dynamical creation and annihilation of assets, prod-
ucts, expectations, and value is.
Take, for example, the monetary side of the notori-
ous [42] Oil-for-Food Programm after the First Iraq War,
and subsequent schemes pursued by the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority after the invasion of Iraq. The au-
thorities for selling oil could have effectively monetized
oil; that is, they could sell it to some companies or di-
rectly to banks; in exchange for oil they could produce
money “out of thin air.” According to some sources [43]
360 tons of cash in the form of US$ notes totaling
US$ 9, 000, 000, 000 = US$ 9 × 109 – or, expressed in
ISO standards, 9 giga-US$, or 9 GUS$ – in pallets were
flown from the US to Iraq in exchange for oil. The cash
was printed after BNP Paribas, on request of the United
States of America, was authorized by United Nations to
transfer an equivalent amount to the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. After the oil was consumed, the cash remained in
the economy and contributed to M0 (if not burnt or ir-
retrievably lost otherwise).
From a counterbalance point of view, there exist two
possibilities:
• the oil could be seen as an investment for produc-
ing other assets (such as plastic) whose value might
even be higher than all the assets and services con-
sumed through its production;
• alternatively, the oil might just have been burnt for
heating or leisure trips.
It can be safely stated that nobody knows what the ratios
between these alternative is. Indeed, this is true not only
for Iraq oil, but for all oil, regardless of its origin, and for
other monetized commodities in general.
Thus, whether the monetization of assets is counter-
balanced and thus contributes to inflation or deflation
remains unknown. Yet, it is generally believed that there
is a temporally stable balance between the money stock
and assets. With this economic unknowable the “naive”
quantity theory of money characterized by the state-
ment [8, Chapter II] “other things equal, prices vary di-
rectly with the quantities of money in circulation,” breaks
down, because both the “quantities of money in circula-
tion” as well as the “equality of other things” are con-
cepts which can neither be operationalized nor measured.
So, one is again relegated to the fantasies of the markets
and individuals.
Indeed, the public belief in such an effective equilib-
rium is a necessary and inevitable delusion for the accep-
tance of any kind of fiat money. As long as this delu-
sion can be maintained for or imposed upon the major-
ity of market participants, fiat money is relatively stable;
regardless of the disproportion between volume of fiat
money and marketable assets.
H. Fiat fantasies versus deficit spending
You do look, my son, in a mov’d sort, as if
you were dismay’d: be cheerful, sir: our revels
now are ended. These our actors, as I foretold
you, were all spirits and are melted into air,
into thin air: and, like the baseless fabric of
this vision, the cloud-capp’d towers, the gor-
geous palaces, the solemn temples, the great
globe itself, yea, all which it inherit, shall
dissolve and, like this insubstantial pageant
faded, leave not a rack behind. We are such
stuff as dreams are made on, and our little
life is rounded with a sleep. (Prospero, in
William Shakespeare’s The Tempest)
In more recent times the money created via moneti-
zation of products of the financial sector, such as spec-
ulative derivatives of any kind, has by far outnumbered
the money created by governments (bonds) in their at-
tempt of deficit spending as a means to maintain low un-
employment rates, social stability, and military spend-
ing. Therefore, it appears almost absurd when in-
vestment bankers (and some associated “conservative”
economists), blame governments of Keynsianism, while
simultaneously engaging in excessive fiat money creation
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several magnitudes higher than any of these additional
government activities. Furthermore, in times of crises
they attempt to consolidate their assets by seducing or
blackmailing governments into securing them through fu-
ture taxation; thereby effectively taking hostage entire
populations, as well as the future generations, of these
states by dragging them into debt. Indeed, besides all
ideological “blabla” talk directed toward the uninformed
public, all kinds of money multiplications – both from
government sources as well as from the financial sectors
– contribute to an inflation of the monetary base and to
its effective demise.
II. MONEY CREATION BY EXPECTATIONS
A. Indirect fiat monetization by expectations
The financial industry has become a menace
to society. Its ability to create credit has
brought it undue political influence, enabling
the industry to deregulate itself and to en-
gage in such excesses that only a massive in-
fusion of taxpayers’ money has saved it from
extinction. . . . Credit creation is too danger-
ous to be left to the discretion of bankers.
(Richard Duncan, as quoted by William Pe-
sek in a Bloomberg Businessweek commentary
“Forget Geithner’s Job, We’d Rather Run
China” on February 16, 2010)
Some nonbank agents such as explorers, invaders, in-
vestors or inventors require money for future profits. Ex-
amples of such nonbank agents are homeowners expect-
ing future salaries, industries expecting the production
of future assets, speculators expecting a development of
future markets favorable for them, or states waging war
on other states in the expectation of victory, allowing the
unsolicited exploitation of the opponent’s wealth.
Monetization treats the expectation of future profits
quite similarly as assets: a bank can monetize the expec-
tation of future profits by acquiring the right of collect-
ing paybacks from the investor in the future. In order to
make sense for the investor, these repayments should at
least be counterbalanced by the expected profits. There
is a difference between a directly obtained asset and a
future asset: whereas the ownership rights of assets are
immediately transferred to banks in the first, direct mon-
etization case, the banks obtain no immediate control
over future assets. In more concrete terms: whereas, for
example, by direct monetization, the bank can re-sell a
monetized real estate property immediately after acquisi-
tion, it could only re-sell the rights of future assets in the
indirect case. As future profits are necessarily uncertain
and subject to possible failures, they are always at risk.
For a variety of reasons – for instance to counterbal-
ance their risk and the resulting unwillingness to donate
money for uncertain future profits, or to compensate for
the temporal delay in consumption [44] or foregone prof-
its, and as a reflection of the market price of “generic”
future profit expectations – banks levy interest. Debt,
that is, the obligation to repay in the future, is always
associated with interest [45]. Interest is the right to (reg-
ularly) collect money from the debtor, in addition to the
principal – or to increase the principal as the time of
lending increases – at a certain rate.
Note that, without fiat credit and dept, the amount
of money could only be sustained proportional to the
growth (or decline) of marketed assets, as at any given
moment it would only be possible to invest money which
has already been created, and not also money created in
expectation of future profits. By lack of liquidity, when
compared to economies allowing fiat credit, this bound
seriously cripples an economy. These principles also have
to assume that through monetization (and its inverse)
a reasonable equilibrium or balance between the money
stock and marketed assets can be maintained, thereby
synchronously accounting for all created and annihilated
or stored assets in a sort of virtual inventory; an assump-
tion which is highly questionable.
Alas, if the fiat credit and thus also the debt has no
direct backing by commodities or monetized assets, the
money creation is principally unbounded, resulting in
monetary crises if the future profits are overestimated.
Yet, despite these unfavorable side effects, the creation
of money through the monetization of future profits has
been one of the driving forces for the increase of produc-
tion and services, and the prosperity at large [10, 13].
Anybody arguing against monetization of future prof-
its and fiat credit might just as well propose going back
to some kind of unrealistic and unsustainable monetary
stone age.
B. Interest as tax and appropriation
A republic, if you can keep it. (Benjamin
Franklin at the close of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787)
· · ·
The U.S., UK, and Canada are the key Plu-
tonomies - economies powered by the wealthy.
[28]
As a result of usury the banking sector receives a cer-
tain amount of additional income on an annual base
in terms of the interest paid. Where exactly does this
money required to pay the interest, in addition to the
principal granted, come from? It cannot come from any
other source than the fiat money created by the banks
themselves.
As the overall amount of valuable assets competing for
money (and vice versa) is limited, the effect is a sort of
general taxation by interest [46], a re-appropriation of as-
sets toward the banks. Even under ideal conditions, the
compound interest levied amounts to a geometric pro-
gression of the volume of money, the assets created, as
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well as a redistribution of wealth in favor of the financial
sector.
This dynamical reappropriation has been termed
Matthew Effect [5] because of its mentioning in the Bible.
It is commonly expressed by stating that “the rich tend
to get richer, and the poor tend to get poorer.”
C. Credit as egalitarian instrument
Contrary to the compund interest contributing to the
Matthew Effect [5] mentioned earlier, credit can be per-
ceived as a big equalizer. Because, as has been stated by
Galbraith [8, p. 71] “It allows the man with energy and
no money to participate in the economy more or less on
a par with the man who has capital of his own. And the
more casual the conditions under which credit is granted
and hence the more impecunious those accommodated,
the more egalitarian credit is.”
Indeed, for the seller or consumer it makes no difference
whether the money obtained by selling an asset, or the
product bought, has its origin in credit and debt, or in
capital in the possession of the buyer of that asset, or the
seller of that product.
That is, there are really two aspects of money creation
through credit and debt: on the one hand, money cre-
ation through credit and debt tends to tear society apart
by making the poor even poorer, and the rich even richer.
On the other hand money creation through credit and
debt allows the poor to participate, ascend and come out
of poorness by invoking money which they originally do
not possess.
D. Consequences of no or low interest
Thus far we have dealt with actual sub-
stances; but some forms of wealth deceive
our eyes and minds alike. I see there let-
ters of credit, promissory notes, and bonds,
empty phantoms of property, ghosts of sick
Avarice, with which she deceives our minds,
which delight in unreal fancies; for what are
these things, and what are interest, and ac-
count books, and usury, except the names of
unnatural developments of human covetous-
ness? . . . What are your documents, your
sale of time, your blood-sucking twelve per
cent. interest? These are evils which we owe
to our own will, which flow merely from our
perverted habit, having nothing about them
which can be seen or handled, mere dreams
of empty avarice. Wretched is he who can
take pleasure in the size of the audit book
of his estate, in great tracts of land culti-
vated by slaves in chains, in huge flocks and
herds which require provinces and kingdoms
for their pasture ground, in a household of
servants, more in number than some of the
most warlike nations, or in a private house
whose extent surpasses that of a large city!
After he has carefully reviewed all his wealth,
in what it is invested, and on what it is
spent, and has rendered himself proud by the
thoughts of it, let him compare what he has
with what he wants: he becomes a poor man
at once. (Lucius Annaeus Seneca in On Ben-
efits, Chapter VII, Section X.)
In view of the possible imbalances from the accumu-
lation of wealth by the financial sector, attempts have
been made to abandon interest altogether. Christianity
has condemned usury [47, 48]. Also Islamic communities
reprehend riba [49].
Alas, an abandonment of interest implies at least two
undesirable alternatives:
• either the amount of credit has to be limited by cri-
teria which effectively introduce privileges: if there
is a limited supply of credit, who should receive it?
• else if there is no limit to the amount of credit avail-
able, any agent in the market would find it possible,
at least in the extreme case, to “buy up all available
assets.” Because of the zero cost of borrowing this
could happen without penalty. But then, if there
are more than one agents competing in the market,
prices will go up ad infinitum; effectively causing
(hyper)inflation.
For example, the high demand for real estate proper-
ties reflects the particular importance and the relevance
of housing to individuals and families. From the point
of view of the buyer, the price of a property appears to
be limited by the portion of the household income avail-
able for the payment of dept accepted for acquiring that
property. In more concrete terms, the product of inter-
est rate times the property price should not exceed the
buyer’s available income, and thus the price of the prop-
erty is bound by the income divided by the interest rate.
As a result, property prices tend to increase on decreas-
ing interest rates, as potential buyers can afford to bid
higher prices. The leverage or ratio of this price increase
is determined by the inverse interest rate. In the (absurd)
limit, with “free credit” associated with zero interest rate,
a single buyer would be able to bid an unlimited price for
any given property. As stated earlier, by unrealistically
assuming those prices will not go up due to competing
money, the buyer could acquire all properties available
on the market.
E. Plasticity of interest rates
Why should a noncentral bank not offer loans with
lower interest rates than a central bank? Surely, if a
noncentral bank is bound by some reserve constraints,
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it may not be totally unreasonable to offer much lower
interest rates which are bound by that reserve constraints
(in percent of the minimum reserve fraction). For a bank
can create money for loans virtually without any costs
“out of thin air.” It may use this ability to compete on
the loan market.
Related to these issues appears to be a common belief
that it is possible to curb the money supply by regulatory
measures. Indeed, interest rates of consumer credits or
mortgages and, say, the U.S. federal funds rate might be
correlated. As has been mentioned earlier, this is usu-
ally explained by money volume constraints on the non-
central banks, effectively established via some regulatory
mechanisms involving bank reserves: in order to prevent
bank runs or an unbounded lending policy, banks usu-
ally should not be able to create more money than a
certain percentage or fraction of some securities or re-
serves they hold; resulting in a mild form of reserve mul-
tiplication [1, 2, 21]. Alas, in view of the recent events
connected to the packaging and reselling of dept by the
financial industry in the U.S. and elsewhere, this frac-
tional reserve banking system, appears to be a commonly
told fairy tale.
On the contrary, it is in the legitimate interest of banks
to avoid any reserve constraints, by any quasi-legal pos-
sibility. In the present competitive and highly liquid fi-
nancial market environment, it is impossible for financial
institutions to avoid stretching the regulatory bonds to
the extreme; otherwise they will be out of business soon,
overtaken by the competitors which attract their greedy
investors.
As has also been mentioned earlier, the amount of out-
standing credit of a financial institution is directly pro-
portional to the interest it levies, and consequently to
its income. There is, for instance, no immediate reason
why a bank should not create money and lend it out for
a lower interest rate than the central bank, provided it
is not too much bound by minimal fractional reserves:
even if the interest rate is arbitrary low, as long as it is
positive, there is some obtainable gain. Likewise, no cus-
tomer needs to fail because of defaulting credit: in the
extreme case it would even be conceivable to levy no in-
terest at all until such time when the customer can serve
the interest again. Indeed, the customer may be released
from debt totally and permanently; this, however, should
be done in secrecy, because otherwise all debtors would
attempt to default as well. Such gifts, of course, can only
be granted because the cost of money creation for banks
is negligible.
One may argue that the levels of interest, as well as
the “haircuts” of customer credits discussed here are in-
acceptable. This may be right, but not because of the
money volumes thus reappropriated to the failing bank
clients. Indeed, as the value of fiat money is primarily
fantasy-driven, any such measure would have demoral-
izing effects on the perception of money, and may thus
contribute to the demise of it.
III. INSTABILITIES & UNKNOWABLES
A. Is interest sustainable?
And I sincerely believe . . . that banking es-
tablishments are more dangerous than stand-
ing armies; and that the principle of spend-
ing money to be paid by posterity, under the
name of funding, is but swindling futurity on
a large scale. (Thomas Jefferson, from a Let-
ter to John Taylor, dated May 28th, 1816,
in Memoirs, Correspondence and Private Pa-
pers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume IV.)
The (exponentially) fast growing compound interest
suggests that, because of the resulting exploding money
volume, money creation by debt and successive debt re-
structuring appears to be unsustainable. Indeed, one
could suspect that (compound) interest is a malversation
both of governments – who profit from not having to levy
taxes or imposing budget cuts – and of the Money Trust,
collecting that (compound) interest. Thus it is quite jus-
tified to ask whether there are benign scenarios involving
(compound) interest?
One way to avoid this vicious circle is sustainable
growth: in this scenario the investment made possible by
debt (at least) pays off the principal as well as the (com-
pound) interest at later times. Thereby, the newly cre-
ated assets and services can be monetized, and (part of)
the money created through direct monetization is then
used to pay back the principal debt and the (compound)
interest. Ideally, in this scenario, debt and the associated
interest can create growth and wealth [10].
From this point of view, an economic expansion is only
sustainable if it is the result of an increase in investment
that, in addition to an increase in saving, is funded by a
credit expansion which creates marketable assets which
at least compensate the money created. As a result, an
economic boom could in principle be sustainable even if
it is only the result of a credit expansion. If, on the
other hand, the investment does not yield enough to pay
back the principal and the (compound) interest, then the
money created through debt will contribute to an unsus-
tainable Ponzi-type pyramid game, resulting in more and
more debt, and ultimately in a business cycle crash.
This position, which allows for money and credit
creation, is in contradiction to the position – some-
times (misleadingly) associated with the mainstream
economist’s understanding of Austrian business cycle
theory [50] – that an economic expansion is only sustain-
able if it is the result of an increase in investment that
is entirely funded by an increase in savings alone. As a
corollary, an economic boom that would merely be the
result of credit expansion should not be sustainable.
Nevertheless, for various rather obvious reasons also
discussed earlier, it is almost impossible to adjust and
fine-tune the money expansion via credit creation with
the assets to be created in the future. During the early
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stages of any Ponzi-type pyramid games, expansion of
credit will increase the profits of the money creating
entities, thereby effectively discouraging more prudent
strategies. Together with the pressure from governments
to allow greater fiscal deficits at low interest rates, the
money issuing authorities will thus most likely end up
with an unsustainable level of credit expansion. As a
result, these economies will eventually undergo a mone-
tary crises as a direct consequence of unsustainable credit
expansion.
B. Containment and osmosis of money types
If the markets are relatively isolated, the
(re)appropriations from the different price growth
in different sectors (e.g., food and real estate) may not
be perceivable for some time [11, p. 396]. For instance,
“Gordon Gekko” a financial Wall Street tycoon, earning
“a lot of money” through his financial transactions, will
not influence the prices of sausages sold on Wall Street
“too much,” as he might not be interested in buying
“too many” sausages there, simply because he cannot
eat “too many” of them to influence the “street price”
market for sausages. (He seems to prefer steaks anyway.)
As historic examples show, it initially takes some time
to make people realize that the money they hold looses
more and more purchasing power. (If hyperinflation is
in full swing, people are much more aware of the situa-
tion.) Indeed, the stronger stratified a society, the less
will fantasies in one sector leak through and affect prices
in other sectors. Nevertheless, in the long run, the differ-
ent market segments or sectors tend to connect through
the monetary base. Thus eventually the fantasies ex-
erted in one of them will diffuse into other sectors al-
most like osmosis through small interconnections [7, Sec-
tion 1(f)]. If, for instance, the same Wall Street tycoon
attempts to take over most sausage stands ofManhatten,
the very high price he may have to pay for them may in-
directly (through the rate of return on investment) affect
the street price for sausages there. In reaction, as infla-
tion (in terms of sausage price) goes up, labor costs will
increase, contributing to a spiral of inflation.
Effectively, the system of interlinked assets, products
and services – starting from precious commodities such
as gold, copper, silver, or oil, and continuing with the
various money components with increasing “virtuality”
– resembles the multitude of rubles in the late Soviet
Union; there the gold ruble would hypothetically buy
0.987412 grams of gold, yet was never available to the
general public. Also today, one of the most harmful mar-
ket transactions would be the direct exchange of the most
abstract form of money, such as, for instance, government
bonds or financial derivatives, into gold, copper, silver or
platinum.
At the time of writing, once again [51] the monetary
system is inflated (flooded) by monetized fantasies cre-
ated primarily by the financial institutions, and to a
lesser extent by all sorts of government spending, in par-
ticular wars [52, 53]. In order to back up the huge un-
sustainable debts, the financial institutions have turned
for government and central bank help [54]. Governments
effectively back derivatives and other monetized fantasies
created by the financial institutions by (future) tax rev-
enues; whereas central banks everywhere seem to mone-
tize government or even private debt.
It is not totally unreasonable to speculate that the
magnitude of these transactions can neither be sustained
nor contained to the market sectors in which they have
been created. Thus the massive amounts of money vol-
umes (in M3) will eventually spill over to the consumer
sectors, thereby causing (hyper)inflation everywhere.
Moreover, the capacity to back up the M3 volume by
taxation and inflation will decrease for socio-political rea-
sons. The electorates and societies will grow weary of
saving financial institutions through acquiring their risks
and debt. Some or all ultimate debtors such as big gov-
ernments, their associated central banks, and eventually
also the commercial banks will then be forced to submit
to strategies to get rid of debt. As outlined in Chap-
ter IIIG this will mostly be accomplished by inflation
and by defaulting dept.
There may be several ways to survive this monetary
meltdown; some of them rely on gold (not on gold options
on paper, but on self-storing the precious metal) or other
commodities, some on real estate; some people even rely
on little bottles of alcohol and strong spirits, for which,
as they claim, demand will be high in times of crises.
In principle, one could make huge profits by going into
debt now, buying commodities and real estate. After
the monetary meltdown and the following consolidation
of the currency, presently acquired debt could then be
easily repaid in terms of the new money. If that sounds
strange, consider buying a real estate property today for
its price thirty years ago.
C. Pricing ambiguities
The belief that the equilibrium between supply & de-
mand will in general settle at a single particular price,
and the idea that there exist equilibriums in economies
in general, is an idealistic illusion. Let us just consider a
few reasons why.
• The modern markets are driven by whatever com-
munication and (dis)information is fed into them:
⋆ Those who control the media (i.e., those pos-
sessing and paying through ads) might at-
tempt to control the market and public policy.
⋆ The market participants might suffer from an
overload of information; indeed, the excessive
push of large amounts of raw data on to in-
dividuals and institutions might result in the
false impression of well-informedness while ac-
tually contributing to greater confusion.
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⋆ The market participants might lack reliable
criteria or authorities to evaluate the informa-
tion presented to them, or might be fed with
disinformation.
⋆ The perpetual flow of spontaneous news and
opinions via the media may make impossible
the formation of a “communication equilib-
rium.”
• Markets may be subject to trade policies and mili-
tary deployment which might enforce prices.
• The intra-market dynamics might not be suffi-
ciently efficient to settle prices; or there may be
no convergence toward a single price, but rather
price cycles and other more chaotic regimes.
• The volume creation and annihilation of money and
debt by governments, (central) banks, corporations
and individuals might not allow a stabile settlement
of prices by creating (expectations of) a chaotic, or
alternating, or “spiraling” regime [55].
• As money and its various forms and derivatives is
itself marketed, the price of money becomes recur-
sive, self-referential and reflexive. This will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
D. Formal incompleteness of macroeconomics
It requires some intelligence to acknowledge
one’s own dumbness. (Heimito von Doderer,
in Die Strudelhofstiege.)
Related to the the impossibility of equilibria is the fact
that no complete macroeconomic theory (or “maximal
trading strategy”) exists.[56] In what follows it is proved
by reduction to the halting problem [57–60] that every
macroeconomic theory strong enough to contain substitu-
tion, self-reference and (Peano) arithmetic is incomplete
in the sense there exist provable true sentences which
are not derivable and thus independent of that macroe-
conomic theory.
The scheme of the proof by contradiction is as follows:
the existence of a hypothetical macroeconomic prediction
model (trading strategy) capable of solving the problem
of whether or not a certain halting state in macroeco-
nomics (e.g., a certain price) will occur, is assumed. This
could, for instance, be a winning tactics of some suspi-
cious super-trading strategy which takes the code of an
arbitrary macroeconomic theory as input and outputs yes
or no, depending on whether or not the macroeconomic
theory predicts a particular halting state. One may also
think of it as a sort of oracle or black box taking in an
arbitrary trading strategy in terms of its symbolic code,
and outputting one of two symbolic states, say yes or
no, referring to reaching or not reaching its desired goal,
respectively.
Based on this hypothetical macroeconomic prediction
model (trading strategy) we construct another diagonal-
ization (trading) strategy as follows: upon receiving some
arbitrary macroeconomic theory (trading strategy) code
as input, the diagonalization (trading) strategy consults
the hypothetical macroeconomic prediction model (trad-
ing strategy) whether or not this macroeconomic theory
(trading strategy) reaches a macroeconomic halting state
(e.g., a certain price); and upon receiving some answer
it just does the opposite: if the hypothetical macroeco-
nomic prediction model (trading strategy) decides that
the macroeconomic theory (trading strategy) reaches a
particular macroeconomic state (e.g., price), the diago-
nalization (trading) strategy counteracts that prediction
(it may do so easily by some kind of market intervention,
such as volume leveraged buying or selling). Alterna-
tively, if the hypothetical macroeconomic prediction model
(trading strategy) decides that the macroeconomic theory
(trading strategy) does not reach a macroeconomic halt-
ing state in a (e.g., a certain price), the diagonalization
(trading) strategy steers the economy into that state.
The diagonalization (trading) strategy can be forced to
execute a paradoxical task by receiving its own program
code as macroeconomic theory (trading strategy). Be-
cause by considering the diagonalization (trading) strat-
egy, the hypothetical macroeconomic prediction model
(trading strategy) steers the diagonalization (trading)
strategy into a macroeconomic halting state (e.g., a cer-
tain price) if it discovers that it does not halt; conversely,
the hypothetical macroeconomic prediction model (trad-
ing strategy) steers the diagonalization (trading) strategy
into a state different from the halting state if it discovers
that it reaches a halting state.
The contradiction obtained in applying the diagonal-
ization (trading) strategy to its own code proves that this
program, and in particular the hypothetical macroeco-
nomic prediction model (trading strategy), cannot exist.
E. Conjecture of balanced trading
It may be conjectured that all trading strategies are
at most balanced when confronted with all market situa-
tions. Stated differently, a trading strategy which would
be able to win more often than loosing if the market sit-
uation is varied cannot exist. Of course, that would not
exclude certain winning strategies for specified market
situations. For instance, in a bull or bear market trend
resulting in increasing or decreasing prices it is favorable
to bet on increasing or decreasing prices, respectively.
But any such strategy would fail miserably if the market
trend reverses.
F. Fiat money games
Most dangerous of all would be democracy.
The Bank of England was the instrument of
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the ruling class. Among the powers the Bank
derived from that ruling class was that of in-
flicting hardship. It could lower prices and
wages, increase unemployment. (John Ken-
neth Galbraith, in Money: Whence it came,
where it went, Chapter IV.)
Fiat money is unbounded by any supply constraints,
as it can be produced almost cost-free. Thus, as long as
the market participants can be manipulated to believe in
and trust the authorities issuing fiat money – and what
other choice do they have when the possession of gold
is prohibited and the use of silver and copper for money
has been abandoned? – its volume can be expanded and
contracted at will of those in control, at least as long as
command over the money volume is possible.
It is not too unreasonable to speculate that those who
control the money supply need not always and necessar-
ily serve the public good but rather in their own interest.
Alas, even if uniform benignancy is assumed, what is
good for one group may not serve the interest of other
groups; hence there always will be ambivalent tradeoffs
and dynamical reappropriations. In what follows a few
schemes are enumerated which could be used for the reap-
proriation of the wealth of nations and within economies.
One may argue that commodity based money did not
prevent business cycles either, and that overheating an
economy by unsustainable credit creation is not limited
to fiat currencies only. Nevertheless, it might be ar-
gued that fiat currencies are more vulnerable to economic
crises, and bubbles are both greater and longer; and a
subsequent correction tends to be more painful than in
the commodity based case. Alas, it may be countered
that this is the price for liquidity and prosperity that
comes with fiat money.
1. Business cycles of inflation and deflation
By alternating periods of low and high interest rates
it is possible to extract assets from an economy: infla-
tionary periods are characterized by low interest rates,
which encourage “bubble buildups” through investments
with very low yield at high (with respect to subsequent
periods of high interest) prices, as credit money is cheap.
Subsequent deflationary periods can be initiated by ris-
ing interest rates, which cause corrections (lowering) in
prices, credit defaults, and a burst of the investment bub-
ble created in the previous inflationary period.
By subjecting a market to successive periods of infla-
tion and deflation, it is possible to acquire great wealth by
inside knowledge: an inside investor would be prudent to
invest into assets (e.g., stocks, derivatives and real estate)
shortly before or at the initiation of inflationary periods,
riding high on the wave of increasing profits and prices,
and, shortly before a deflationary period sets in, pulling
out of these investments, thereby converting them into
save havens like commodities (e.g. gold, copper and sil-
ver); remaining in these conservative positions until just
before a new inflationary period begins. In that way,
by controlling the business cycle through money supply,
more and more economic assets can be acquired almost
risk-free.
This economic cycle strategy almost appears as if it
represented a perpetuum mobile; but it is not, as it can
only succeed if the investor is capable of controlling the
money supply. Alas, central banks, and the fractional
reserve banking system through multiplication by frac-
tional reserve banking as a whole, have been institution-
alized and should be capable of doing just that – control-
ling the money supply – at least if they are independent
and not constraint by politics and external monetary con-
straints.
One could speculate that a proper price for investment
money (i.e., interest for credit) might be definable by the
absence of business cycles of the type described above.
Whether or not such an ideal interest rate exists remains
highly questionable, as value and price appear highly sub-
jective entities in particular also if they are determined
by future expectations. Monopolistic central banks, and
the fractional reserve banking system as a whole, merely
represent a particular way of handling these issues.
2. The perpetual money machine
As expressed by Franklin (see next chapter) and de-
tailed by [8], the unbounded creation of fiat money can
be a perfect vehicle to finance revolutions and wars of any
kind. The American, the French and the Bolshevik revo-
lutions all used money to execute its goals. This moneys
soon became worthless, but not fast enough to crash the
revolution. After they had taken power the new regimes
always tried to stabilize their money through the intro-
duction of a new monetary regime, thereby abandoning
the old one. People tend to forget after about a gener-
ation that this ever happened, and the game can start
over again.
G. Strategies to get rid of debt
And indeed the whole is a Mystery even to
the Politicians, how we have been able to
continue a War four years without Money,
and how we could pay with Paper, that had
no previously fix’d Fund appropriated specifi-
cally to redeem it. This Currency, as we man-
age it, is a wonderful Machine. It performs its
Office when we issue it; it pays and clothes
Troops, and provides Victuals and Ammu-
nition; and when we are obliged to issue a
Quantity excessive, it pays itself off by Depre-
ciation. (Benjamin Franklin , from a Letter
to Samuel Cooper, dated April 22nd, 1779) in
The writings of Benjamin Franklin. Volume
VII.))
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Not everybody can get rid of debt by eliminating his
creditors by killing them. Historically, this style was ex-
ecuted, for instance, in order to restore the depleted Ro-
man Treasury (Aerarium) through the Roman proscrip-
tion – the persecution of the rich – enacted by Sulla in
82 BC, followed by Catilina in 63 BC who also promised
the abolition the universal cancellation of debts inscribed
on the novae tabulae, and another proscription under the
Second Triumvirate in 43 BC. A different historic exam-
ple is the fight of Philipp IV of France against the Knights
Templar in 1307.
In what follows, three “more civilized” modes of get-
ting rid of debt are mentioned: the first option is direct
monetization of debt accompanied by (hyper)inflation.
The second, politically difficult, option attempts to cut
back on spending, such as levying higher taxes, or by di-
rect budget cuts. Finally, the ultimate fallback option is
bankruptcy or “haircuts” by paying less back than bor-
rowed. Unfortunately, these seem to be the only long-
term options, as there is no free lunch.
1. Monetization of debt and (hyper)inflation
Inflation, and even more so hyperinflation, is one of the
major processes to get rid of debt. The basic idea is quite
simple: if debtors are able to keep interest payments at
sustainable levels in the first time of the loan, they need
not bother about the principal and the interest payments
at later times: because, relative to future price and in-
come levels, inflation will “melt away” both the princi-
pals and interest; that is, quite literally, debtors could
pay back the principal and interest from their “pocket
money.”
That kind of strategy is employed at all scales – at
least subconsciously it is adopted by small investors ac-
quiring home loans, and up to the government level. In
general, the higher the inflation, the faster is the relative
reduction of debt, as measured in absolute debt divided
by the absolute income; but also the more difficult it is
to sustain payments of interest in the first time of the
loan.
2. Cutbacks in spending
Another possibility to get rid of debt is by allocating
resources (such as taxes) to pay off debt. Despite the fact
that these measures are politically difficult to impose,
they are also bad for business activities, as this decrease
of liquidity reduces the amount of money available in the
economy and thus might contribute to recession.
3. Bankruptcy and “haircuts”
A third possibility is to write off debt by bankruptcy
or partial remission of a debt, called “haircut” nowadays.
Here the difficulty lies on the borrower’s side; if borrow-
ers are large banks, this might have negative influences
on all kinds of business activities, and may again cause
recession.
H. Anything that can go wrong, will go wrong
I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000
ways that won’t work. (quote attributed to
Thomas Alva Edison)
The various forms of money multiplication eventually
degrade and annihilate the money supply. I will not
bore the reader with historic evidence; there exist ex-
cellent introductions into the subject [8, 61]. [See also
[11, Chapter XXXI]’ account, as well as Zarlenga [62]’s
and Deutsch [63]’s German controversial reviews.] Let
me just enumerate several ways of wacking the monetary
system; every reader can point out other petty schemes.
• If money is physically presented by commodities
considered precious and very valuable, such as gold,
copper or silver coins, debasement is achieved by
putting less and less of that commodities into a
unit of money while maintaining its nominal value.
• If money is based on commodities considered pre-
cious and very valuable, which are indirectly repre-
sented by notes directly referring to the commodi-
ties with an allegedly fixed amount of commodity
per note – possibly associated with the promise to
redeem the commodity upon presentation of the
note – degradation is achieved by printing more
and more notes referring to a constant amount of
commodities. This is often referred to as commod-
ity based money. Finally,
⋆ seduce the public into not using, and not
hoarding the commodity by making them be-
lieve it is worthless;
⋆ stop redeeming the notes for the commodity;
⋆ prohibit the private possession and use of that
commodity.
• If money is partly based on commodities considered
“precious” and “very valuable,” do so as before:
print more notes per amount commodity.
• If fiat money is based on the pure believe in it,
print more money by multiplying it in various “in-
telligent” ways; e.g.,
⋆ by the fractional reserve banking scheme [21] ;
⋆ by writing Love Letters – that is, by mutual
exchange of “I Owe You”s and using these
Love Letters as collaterals for money via mon-
etization if you can find a rating agency and
a central bank willing to cooperate [30–32];
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⋆ by packaging (e.g. household or mortgage)
debt into bonds, if you can find a rating
agency willing to cooperate, and a customer
willing to buy this bundled debt.
• by counterfeits; indeed the only difference between
counterfeit and “legal” multiplication appears to be
the source of money. But even in this respect the
differences tend to become obscure, as for instance
during World War II allegedly the Banca d’Italia
counterfeited its own money by issuing the same
securities twice with identical registered numbers
and codes.
There are numerous other ways to whack the money
supply; the aforementioned are just commonly used ex-
amples. Many of the world’s most clever minds – in
particular also physicists and mathematicians allured by
relatively large salaries and benefits – breed over new
schemes to legally multiply the monetary base, thereby
contributing to its deterioration of the monetary base.
Microeconomically this makes sense; after all if you don’t
do it, somebody else surely would.
Money multiplication effectively yields a general tax-
ation of the public in favor of the issuer of money. The
reason for this is that the former can buy less with the
amount of money they hold, as the overall price of assets
and goods eventually increases.
Money multiplication also effectively amounts to a
pyramid (Ponzi) scheme, as the earlier money buys more
that the later money, due to an increase of it.
The only theoretical but impractical way of avoiding
these pitfalls is to stick to the physical commodities as
a medium of exchange. Alas, for a variety of reasons,
e.g., for large-scale international trade, for security rea-
sons, as well as for counterfeiting and authentification
reasons (“who knows if this really is gold and not coun-
terfeit?”) this is hardly impossible in a general setup. For
instance, who assures that “electronic gold” is really en-
tirely backed by physical gold, and not just multiplied
and thus merely partially covered? Whom could you
trust? It is not too unreasonable to suspect that, in the
long run, nobody and no institution – public or private
– can be trusted. Government authorities, in particular,
have a very bad record in money multiplication.
IV. AFTERTHOUGHTS
A. Desiderata
It is not enough to have no concept, one must
also be capable of expressing it.[64] (Karl
Kraus, in Die Fackel 697, 60 (1925))
What kind of appropriation of wealth should we adopt?
Should we, for instance, employ a “Robin Hood strategy”
by confiscating from the rich [11, Chapter XXXII] and
giving the poor? Or should we adopt a strategy to pro-
mote achievement? We should take it for granted that,
regardless of the honorable motives which were present
originally, all types of strategies will ultimately get cor-
rupted in one way or another.
But even disregarding the obvious abuse of various
forms of (re)appropriation, it is the Author’s conviction
that, due to a lack of absolute criteria, there is no ob-
jective answer to the question how the wealth of nations
should be appropriated. Thus all attempts in one way
or another must necessarily and inevitably remain sub-
jective. The following two presentations are rendered for
the sake of corroboration of this thesis.
1. Heritage
In a 1981 meeting on “The Worldwide Consequences of
Nuclear War” in Sicily, Paul Dirac noted that the “cap-
italistic” versus the “communistic” forms of economies
should not wage war against one another by maintaining
two seemingly contradicting positions:
• than every child should have an equal right to pur-
sue happiness and well-being; independent of his or
her origins;
• that the parent should be given the right to pass on
to their children those privileges and wealth which
they were able to accumulate; so that their children
would benefit from their parent’s achievements.
Both positions may be quite justifiably considered true;
yet they contradict each other entirely. The Author can-
not offer any reasonable solution to this conundrum. I
believe that it will remain with us forever.
2. Optimizing the distribution of happiness and well-being
One may, for instance, vainly indulge in sophisti-
cated schemes of quantifying and “measuring happi-
ness” or of “subjective life satisfaction” in an attempt
to “(re)appropriate” happiness or life satisfaction. By
some subjective scheme or belief system one may then,
guided by these principles, somehow arbitrarily assume
some “cumulative fitness function” as a criterion for a
desirable state of economic and political affairs.
Any such scheme is based on assumptions about the
specific dependency of happiness on income and wealth.
The degree of happiness as a function of income has been
suggested to be logarithmic; alternatively, it has been
claimed that happiness grows linearly with income and
plateaus at a certain income level.
All of these schemes and the resulting political and eco-
nomic strategies lack objectivity and rational rigor. This,
again, leads to the conclusion that interventionalism ap-
pears inappropriate [11, Part Six]. On the other extreme
of economical tactics is laissez faire: under unhampered
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market conditions there is a very realistic tendency of
concentration of wealth by compound interest and cu-
mulative advantage – again an inescapable dilemma.
3. Ambivalent perception of (in)stability
As Galbraight once mentioned [8, Chapter I], “people
who are experiencing inflation yearn for stable money and
. . . those who are accepting the discipline and the costs
of stability come to accept the risks of inflation. It is this
cycle that teaches us that nothing, not even inflation [[or
stability]], is [[a]] permanent [[desideratum]].”
B. Summary and outlook
. . . a blind man eager to see who knows that
the night has no end, he is still on the go. The
rock is still rolling. [[ . . . ]] One must imagine
Sisyphus happy. (Albert Camus, in Le Mythe
de Sisyphe (English translation: The Myth of
Sisyphus))
Some very general options for monetary systems have
been enumerated and compared. The creation of present
fiat money via monetization, as well as its appropriation
in various setups has been discussed. We have identified
private banks as the main source of money through mon-
etization. Thereby, subject to reserve constraints, banks
absorb (debt related to) assets of value and in exchange
issue fiat money in the form of quantity information in
deposit money accounts.
For various reasons discussed earlier, it may not even
be possible to determine the most fundamental entities
relevant for money:
• the volume of money created;
• the volume of assets and services, both marketed as
well as counterfactual, competing for that money;
• the price as a measure of value of some asset or
service.
Thus the value or price is inevitably determined by
subjective beliefs and fantasies loosely bound by market
constraints. One may imagine such a monetary system
as being “suspended in thought;” its continuity, floating
and benign evolution being guaranteed by common faith.
Any such system is vulnerable to crises and business
cycles. For instance, as asset values are subject to disin-
formation, fraudulent manipulation or hype in anticipa-
tion of future profits or losses, there may be positive and
negative feedbacks resulting in price settlements pushing
certain equity segments far beyond a stable equilibrium
with respect to the rest of the markets.
Inevitably, the interest levied by banks in return for
money created via monetizing debt systematically real-
locates resources toward the financial institutions, and
away from industrial and manual production, farming
and labor.
In prosperous times the abundance of fiat money guar-
antees a continuation of economic growth and individ-
ual welfare. Indeed, it is not totally unjustified to argue
that the current prosperity of science, public life, and
the rise of living comforts in many countries throughout
the globe has been induced by implementing fiat money
schemes. Those stimulus, accompanied by technologies
derived from the natural sciences, has created a boom
with hitherto unprecedented growth and wealth.
Nevertheless, some very elementary dynamical tenden-
cies almost inevitably drive economic systems into crises.
One of these tendencies originate from the inevitable sub-
jectivity of economic values, the greediness of market par-
ticipants, and the positive and negative feedbacks result-
ing in strong volatility of prices.
Another tendency is the Matthews Effect observed in
many other instances [5]: it is the cumulative advantage,
the accumulation of desirable entities at very few loca-
tions, accompanied by a thinning out of these entities
everywhere else; sometimes stated as “the rich getting
richer and the poor getting poorer” [65].
Another common illusion is the belief that Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand” always benignly works for the
“greater good” of economies; when in reality economic
players are confronted with boundless, relentless greed
and prisoner’s dilemmas of all sorts.
In view of all the disadvantages of fiat money, should
we even go so far as to abandon the current fiat money
system, as well as its associated instruments, the cen-
tral bank, and money multiplication by banks within the
fractional reserve banking scheme [21]?
Unfortunately, the alternatives appear to be even more
troublesome than the present state of affairs. Any sys-
tem based on interest-free fiat money creation, in order to
avoid hyperinflation through excessive borrowing associ-
ated with “free” debt, has either to rely on unjustifiable
privileges or chance. And any system based on com-
modity money is heavily dependent on the quantity of
commodities, and also incapable of waging or defending
against (economic) war through the effective monetiza-
tion of future loot or loss. In effect, we would cripple if
not ruin our economies, and would thus behave irrespon-
sibly and destructively, jeopardizing and ruining our own
well-being as well as that of our children.
So, what are the political, economic and social options?
Ought we, for instance, curb banks in their possibilities
to create money? Maybe we should, but if we overdo
we cripple our economies by penalizing investments. If
we do not regulate them at all, we stimulate the natural
greediness of people, and foster pyramid scheme type un-
sustainable business models which assume ever increasing
prices (money supply) resulting in economic crises.
The regulatory fine-tuning requires criteria of perfor-
mance and reliable theories to forecast market behaviors;
unfortunately we do not have any such instruments. But
even if such criteria and regulatory instruments will ex-
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ist in the future – which I doubt – there might simply
be not any possibility to prevent economic crises and the
resulting business cycles. This may be due to the inher-
ent self-referential character of economic processes, which
tend to amplify gains and losses through market hysteria,
and which – in a diagonalization type manner [60] – are
capable of counteracting the very regulatory procedures
which are established.
Ought we thus accept occasional monetary crises and
the associated business cycles? I am afraid, yes.
Ought we accept imbalances of appropriation and a
(geometric) redistribution of wealth toward “the rich,”
and in particular toward the banks and other financial
institutions, as well as other aggregates commanding ever
increasing amounts of money? I am afraid, yes. I am
unaware of any measure which could counterbalance the
accumulation of wealth, also called the Matthews Effect,
in the long run.
There are quite serious political connotations to keep in
mind: As money is the representation of a particular type
of asset value, those who control and create money have
equivalent capabilities to deplore economic and political
power. It is quite commonly accepted that societies and
empires may be “steered” or even dominated by those
who have money [66]; to the effect that “money” renders
entire governments; or at least corrupts or overthrows
them. At some point we might wake up and realize that,
facilitated by money, our “democracies” have turned into
plutonomies [28, 65] and oligarchies.
To close this brief discussion in a positive, pragmatic
mood, let me mention ways to legally get rich along the
monetary lines discussed, without relying on inherited
wealth:
• One of the first and foremost opportunities would
be to acquire or start up a central bank if some
country would allow one to do so; possibly in ex-
change of a credit line.
• A fallback option would be to acquire or start up a
noncentral bank, or some organization issuing notes
which are accepted as some form of exchange pay-
ment.
• A third option would be to wait until chance singles
one out as a beneficiary of the Matthews Effect.
(This may never happen.)
• A fourth option would be to “ride the tides of infla-
tion and deflation,” and dynamically increase debt
levels, which must be associated with sustainable
levels of interest payments, at proper times. With-
out inside information, this, however, may be just
as risky as participating in a Ponzi-type pyramid
game.
On a more existentialist and personal level, I propose
to consider money as one of Sisyphus’ more absurd as-
signments [67].
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